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Hulse: Expansive DNA Testing

NOTE
DANGEROUS BALANCE:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
VALIDATION OF EXPANSIVE DNA
TESTING OF FEDERAL PAROLEES
INTRODUCTION

For many, having blood drawn is simply part of a routine
doctor's visit. However, for parolees, such as Thomas Kincade,
their blood is drawn not for medical purposes, but rather to
extract DNA.! The DNA and the identifying information are
then loaded into a database, which law enforcement officers
search every time they attempt to solve a crime with DNA evidence. 2 If the parolee refuses, he or she faces misdemeanor
charges, revocation of release, and more prison time.'
In United States v. Kincade, a sharply divided Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, held that mandatory blood testing of parolees under certain circumstances is not an unreasonable
search and seizure and, thus, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States! While
courts have considered constitutional challenges to both state
and federal DNA testing statutes, the majority of these cases

1

See infra notes 13 to 24 and accompanying text.

2Id.
S See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
• United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004). The Kincade
opinion and this casenote treat the terms parole, probation, and supervised release
similarly. Id. at 816-17 & n.2 ("Our cases have not distinguished between parolees,
probationers, and supervised releasees for Fourth Amendment purposes.").
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concerned inmates, not parolees.· Although the Kincade decision followed other court decisions in approving DNA testing,
unlike the other courts that have considered this issue, the
Kincade court's analysis could be used overbroadly, in violation
of Fourth Amendment privacy rights.·
Despite the utility of DNA databases in solving violent
crimes, such databases should not infringe upon an ordinary
citizen's constitutionally protected privacy rights. This Note
asserts that while the outcome of the Ninth Circuit decision in
U.S. v. Kincade was virtually inevitable, the standard the court
applied is overbroad and should be applied narrowly as precedent.
Part I provides a background of federal DNA testing legislation, the Fourth Amendment implications of DNA testing and
two DNA testing cases leading up to the U.S. v. Kincade decision. Part II analyzes the plurality and dissenting opinions of
the U.S. v. Kincade decision. s Part III argues that the plurality's balancing test has a potential for inappropriate application. 9 Finally, Part IV concludes that the Kincade balancing
test should be narrowly applied as precedent after a meaningful balancing of interests, and not as a fat;ade for everexpanding government interests. 10
7

1.

BACKGROUND

DNA testing by law enforcement officials for purposes of
solving or investigating crimes is considered a search and seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment." However, in U.S.
v. Kincade, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of

5 See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302, 303 (4th Cir. 1992); Groceman v. United States Dept. of Justice, 354 F.3d
411, 412 (5th Cir. 2004); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004); but see
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1144 (10th Cir. 2003).
6 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004); see also infra
notes 113 to 154 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 11 to 63 and accompanying text.
S See infra notes 64 to 112 and accompanying text.
• See infra notes 113 to 154 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
11 United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989»; see also U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
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DNA searches performed pursuant to a federal statute, the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. 12
A.

THE DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG ELIMINATION ACT

The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (hereinafter,
"DNA Act") provides the federal government with authority to
gather DNA samples from people who have been convicted of
certain federal crimes, such as murder and sex crimes. 13 The
DNA Act also created authority for federal, state and local law
enforcement to collect, analyze, and store samples in a DNA
database called the Combined DNA Index System (hereinafter,
"CaDIS") from persons convicted of certain federal crimes. 14
The DNA Act also funds federal, state, and local law enforcement's efforts to process DNA samples collected from crime
scenes that have the potential to yield important evidence for
law enforcement. 15
The DNA Act requires federal offenders, convicted of certain offenses, to submit to mandatory DNA testing. 16 The original version of the DNA Act required testing of persons convicted of the following crimes: murder, manslaughter, homicide, sexual abuse, peonage and slavery, kidnapping, robbery or
burglary, incest, arson, and attempt or conspiracy to commit
any of the listed felonies. 17 However, the USA PATRIOT Act,
passed in October 2001, amended the DNA Act by expanding
12 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004); DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000).
\3 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1), (d)(1) (2001).
The list of qualifying crimes was
changed in October 2004. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(1) (2004). For more discussion
regarding this change, see infra notes 16 to 19 and 133 to 144 and accompanying text.
" H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8 (2000). CODIS contains DNA profiles from
every state, including samples taken from persons convicted of qualifying crimes, samples from crime scenes, and samples provided by families of missing persons. Id.
CODIS aids law enforcement nationwide by linking crime scenes together to aid investigations, and matching crime scenes to perpetrators. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819-20.
For
current
CODIS
statistics,
see
NDIS
Statistics,
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/hqnablcodislclickmap.htm. (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Convicted
offender profiles in CODIS as of December 2004 number 2,038,470 and forensic profiles
number 93,956. Id. In California, offender profiles number 244,704, forensic profiles
number 6,673, and 930 investigations were aided as of December 2004. Id.
1> H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8 (2000).
16 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 816-817 (citing Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Federal Probation
Joins the World of DNA Collection, 66 Fed. Probation 30, 30-32 (2002); 42 U.S.C. §
14135a(a)(1) (2001».
1742 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2000).
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the list of qualifying offenses to include two additional broad
categories: "crimes of violence" and "Federal crimes of terrorism.
A conviction of any of the listed crimes subjects one to
testing, whether while in custody of the Bureau of Prisons
(hereinafter, "BOP"), or after release. 19
Unlike previous statutory attempts requiring DNA testing
from individuals convicted of crimes, this statute extends its
reach to individuals after their release from the prison system:o
For those inmates released before the BOP implemented nationwide testing in 2002, the DNA Act requires that they now
submit to testing at the request of their parole officer!1 Although only specific crimes require an individual to be tested,
there is no requirement that the ex-offender be on release from
prison for his or her original qualifying offense to be subject to
mandatory testing. 22 For example, a person convicted of a
qualifying offense who is currently on parole or probation for a
second, non-qualifying crime, is still subject to testing. 23 Furthermore, non-compliance with a request for testing carries a
misdemeanor penalty, which can serve as a basis for revocation
of release. 24
",8

18 42 u.s.c. § 14135a(d)(2)(a), (b) (2001). A "crime of violence" is defined as "an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another, or any other offense that is a felony and
that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. §
16(a), (b) (2004). A "Federal crim[e] of terrorism" is an offense, committed in conjunction with specified crimes, "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government
by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct." 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(a) (2002); see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 846-848; see U.S.A. PATRIOT Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat 272, 364 (2001).
18 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2) (2004). The BOP takes blood samples from qualifying incarcerated individuals pursuant to the DNA Act. Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Fed·
eral Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection, 66 Fed. Probation 30, 30 (2002).
20 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2) (2004); H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8-9 (2000).
21 Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Federal Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection,
66 Fed. Probation at 30 (2002).
22 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (2001).
23 [d.; see also, e.g., United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1133 (E.D. Cal
2002).
.. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5) (2004) ("An individual from whom the collection of a
DNA sample is authorized under this subsection who fails to cooperate in the collection
of that sample shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and punished in accordance
with Title 18."); see also United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §
7B1.3(a)(1) (2004); available at http://www.ussc.govI2004guidlgI2004.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005).
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FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE DNA ACT

The U.S. Supreme Court has long held "that taking a blood
sample constitutes a search [of a person] under the Fourth
Amendment. ""5 The Fourth Amendment delineates every person's right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures"
of their body, property, and homes. 26 For a search to be considered reasonable, it must be supported by probable cause that
there is "evidence of a crime or illegal goods at the place to be
searched."27 Ordinarily, a warrant is evidence of, and supported by probable cause. 28 However, in certain situations
where procuring warrants are impractical, an exception to the
warrant requirement may justify a search.29

1.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

One line of exceptions to traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis consists of searches conducted pursuant to special
needs. 3D Special needs searches accomplish "important non-law
enforcement purposes" in situations where warrants are im,. See Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1134 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989».
,. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also, e.g., Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.").
'rI U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King,
Criminal Procedure § 3.3(a), 141 (4th ed. 2004); Myron Moskovitz, Cases and Problems
in Criminal Procedure: The Police 3 (4th ed. 2004).
28 LaFave, Israel, King, supra.
To obtain a warrant, law enforcement officers
submit affidavits to a magistrate judge stating facts or evidence supporting the conclusion that a search is likely to lead to evidence helpful to an investigation. Kincade,379
F.3d at 822.
29 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822; see also Jonathan Kravis, Case Comment: A Better
Interpretation of "Special Needs" Doctrine after Edmond and Ferguson, 112 Yale L.J.
2591, 2598 (June 2003) ("[WJhether or not the maintenance of a DNA database for the
purpose of exonerating innocent persons is properly characterized as law-enforcementrelated, that benefit simply cannot be achieved without a regime of warrantless
searches. If the government had to obtain a warrant before conducting DNA Act
searches, the CODIS database would likely fail. The government would not be able to
establish probable cause for the vast majority of the searches, and would not go to the
trouble of getting so many warrants even if it could. The warrantless searches mandated by the DNA Act are not merely law enforcement shortcuts. Rather, they are a
necessary precondition to the maintenance of a DNA database .... ").
30 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24.
Two other exceptions are exempted areas and
administrative searches. [d. Exempted area searches include searches at borders and
airports; administrative searches "includeD inspections of closely regulated businesses." [d.
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practicaL3! Non-law enforcement entities, such as employers,
school authorities, or probation officers, usually conduct special
needs searches pursuant to public health and safety objectives.32 For example, sobriety tests are considered an acceptable special need that is exempted from warrant and probable
cause requirements.33
Courts have also made an exception to Fourth Amendment
search requirements by applying a balancing test, which compares the searchee's expectation of privacy against the public
policy behind the particular search." The United States Supreme Court's holdings in Schmerber v. California and Winston
v. Lee concerned bodily intrusions, which the Court analyzed
with a balancing test."5
2.

Schmerber v. California

In Schmerber v. California, the United States Supreme
Court held that a blood extraction implicated, but did not violate, the Fourth Amendment."6 In Schmerber, a police officer
ordered a doctor to draw blood from a suspect involved in a
drunken driving accident. 37 The Court balanced the intrusion
of the blood draw against the need to collect evidence of the
blood alcohol level of the suspect."B The Court held that because
the driver's blood alcohol level would decrease before the officer
could secure a warrant, the police officer did not act unreasonably in requiring a blood draw before procuring a warrant.39
The Court cautioned, however, that the holding in Schmerber

Id. at 823.
32 Id.; William E. Ringel, Searches, Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 10.13
(2004), WL.
33 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
§ 5.4(c), 208 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Fink v. Ryan, 174 m. 2d 302, 308 WI. 1996».
The Fink court held that because "Illinois has a special need to suspend the licenses of
chemically impaired drivers and to deter others from driving while chemically impaired," sobriety tests are acceptable to fulfill that special need. Id.
34 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (stating that the
"need to search" is balanced "against the invasion which the search entails.") .
.. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 766 (1985).
36 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767,772.
37 Id. at 758.
38 Id. 770-71.
39 Id.
31
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did not to permit "more substantial intrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions."'o

3.

Winston v. Lee

The United States Supreme Court's holding in a later case,
Winston v. Lee, balanced a surgical intrusion against the need
for preserving evidence of a crime:! In Winston, a suspect in an
attempted robbery was shot by his intended victim:2 The Commonwealth of Virginia attempted to force the suspect to undergo surgery to recover the bullet from his body, which the
Commonwealth wanted to use it as evidence against the suspect.'3 The Court granted the suspect injunctive relief to prevent the Commonwealth from forcing him to undergo anesthesia and surgery:'
In granting the injunction, the Court noted that "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence .
. . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to
produce evidence of a crime."'5 The search was unreasonable
because the Commonwealth's interest in the bullet did not
outweigh the privacy intrusion brought on by surgically removing the bullet lodged in the suspect's chest:·
Despite the fact that the searches in both Schmerber and
Winston were conducted pursuant to the government's assertion of a need to collect evidence and solve crimes, the Winston
court found that the surgical intrusion was much greater than
the intrusion of Schmerber's blood extraction, and could not
pass Fourth Amendment muster:7 Schmerber and Winston
thus laid the groundwork for challenges to DNA testing legislation in Rise v. Oregon and United States v. Miles: s

[d. at 772.
Winston, 470 U.S. at 766.
42 [d. at 755-56.
43 [d. at 757, 767 .
.. [d. at 757-58, 767 .
.., [d. at 759.
'" [d. at 766 .
• 7 [d.
48 Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F. 3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1160 (1996); United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
40
41
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C.

CHALLENGES TO DNA TESTING LEGISLATION: PRIVACY VS.
GOVERNMENT INTERESTS

1.

Rise v. State of Oregon' privacy expectation of inmates

In Rise v. State of Oregon, the prison inmate plaintiffs
challenged an Oregon law that is similar to the DNA Act in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. 49 The law requires DNA testing of persons convicted of sex offenses or murder.50 The district court upheld the Oregon DNA testing law
under a special needs analysis. 51 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision, but instead of using a special needs
test, employed a balancing test, weighing law enforcement
needs against the minimal intrusion of a blood extraction,
which the court said was "substantially the same as ... fingerprinting. "52
The dissent in Rise disagreed with the majority's use of the
balancing test. 53 Citing Schmerber v. California, the dissent
found that a blood extraction, unlike fingerprinting in the booking process, was not sufficiently "routine" to justify the privacy
intrusion. 54 According to the dissent, the DNA extraction in
Rise could not be constitutional because Schmerber's holding
required individualized suspicion. 55
2.

United States v. Miles: Privacy expectation of parolees

In a subsequent case, United States v. Miles, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California limited the
Rise balancing test in a successful Fourth Amendment challenge to the DNA Act:6 In Miles, the defendant committed
armed robbery, a qualifying feiony, in 1974: When the DNA
7

Rise, 59 F. 3d at 1558.
Id.
51 Id. at 1559.

49

00

52 [d. (citing Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (stating that "it is
elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to . . . fingerprinting ... as part of routine identification processes."».
63 Rise, 59 F. 3d at 1564 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 1565 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
56 United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2002). The government
did not appeal this decision to the Ninth Circuit. Id.
57 Id. at 1132.
54

65
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Act was passed in 2000, the defendant was on supervised release for a different non-qualifying felony, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 68 He argued that requiring him to
submit to testing violated the Fourth Amendment because the
government had no evidence of probable cause except for his
original conviction, thirty years prior!9
The district court agreed with the defendant, and did so by
distinguishing Rise. GO Someone on parole for a different crime
thirty years after his qualifying conviction, the district court
reasoned, does not have a sufficiently lowered expectation of
privacy to tip the balance in favor of the government's interest
in DNA testing. 61 Therefore, the privacy interests of a convicted
person on release were greater thirty years after the offense
than closer in time to the original offense. 62 Even though Rise
only requires a conviction to lessen a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, Miles requires that the conviction be contemporaneous with the government's DNA-testing need for the
balance of interests to tip in favor of the government.63

II.

UNITED STATES V. KINCADE DECISION

A year after the Miles court found parolees could not be
constitutionally subjected to DNA testing, a Northern District
of California court was faced with a parolee's DNA testing challenge in United States. u. Kincade. 64
A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Thomas Kincade committed bank robbery with a firearm
in July 1993:5 Kincade pled guilty and was sentenced to 97
months in prison and three years of supervised release. G6 After
serving his sentence, he was released from prison in August of
.. [d.
69 [d. at 1134.
60 [d. at 1138, 1141.
6. [d. at 1138.
62 [d.
63 Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F. 3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1160 (1996); Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
64 Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1141; United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 820-21
(9th Cir. 2004).
GO Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820.
M [d.
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2000. 67 The conditions of his release contained a requirement
that he abide by the directives of his probation officer and "refrain from committing another Federal, state or local crime."68
Kincade's bank robbery conviction is a qualifying offense
for blood testing under the DNA Act. 69 However, he was released from custody before passage of the DNA Act, and before
the BOP implemented testing. 70 In March of 2002, Kincade's
parole officer requested a blood sample for testing. 7l Kincade
refused to submit to testing.72 Kincade's refusal provided a basis for revocation of his parole. 73
At his revocation hearing, Kincade challenged the validity
of the DNA Act on several grounds, including violation of the
Fourth Amendment." The district court disagreed and revoked
his parole, but stayed the sentence while the Ninth Circuit expedited his appeal. 75 Pending appeal, Kincade committed an
additional violation of the conditions of his supervised release
by testing positive for drug use. 76 Following this violation, the
district court judge lifted the stay on Mr. Kincade's sentence. 77
Once Kincade was imprisoned, and in custody of the BOP, he
was forced to submit to DNA testing. 78 However, he continued
his constitutional challenge to the DNA Act. 7•
On appeal, Kincade asserted "a privacy expectation in his
body, bodily fluids and DNA."80 He also argued that no probable cause existed to justify the intrusion because he was not
Id.
68 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003).
69 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2004).
70 Id.
Kincade was released in August, but the DNA Act was not passed until
later that same year, in December of 2000. Id.; see also DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000).
71 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820.
72Id.
73 Id. at 82l.
7. Id.
Kincade also challenged the DNA Act on grounds that it violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause, separation of powers, and the Due Process Clause. Id.
75 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1098-99 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813,821 (9th Cir. 2004). If the court had not stayed
the sentence, Kincade would have immediately been subjected to testing once in custody of the BOP. Id.
7. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004).
77 Id.
78Id.
79 Id.
80 Opening Br. for Appellant at 22, United States v. Kincade, 2002 WL 32181458
(9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-50380).
67
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under suspicion for a crime when his parole officer requested a
blood sample.B1 He argued that the special-needs exception
could not apply because the DNA Act has a clear law enforcement purpose of solving crimes. B2 This purpose is, therefore, in
direct conflict with the requirement that special needs be for a
non-law enforcement purpose.B3 Kincade did not argue against
a balancing-test exception on appeal. B'
A three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit held that the
DNA Act violated Kincade's Fourth Amendment rights. B5 After
noting the general rule that reasonable searches are supported
by probable cause, the Ninth Circuit panel employed a threepart analysis. B6 First, the court analyzed the Fourth Amendment implications of DNA testing, and rejected the Rise holding that found no difference between fingerprinting and blood
extractions. B7 Second, the court decided that DNA testing of
parolees could not satisfy a constitutional balancing test without reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed an
additional crime. BB Third, the court rejected the idea that a spe. cial-needs exception could apply to DNA testing, because the
purpose of the DNA Act was to acquire "evidence for future
criminal investigations," a clear law enforcement purpose. B'
The majority of the panel viewed the forced extraction of
Kincade's blood and subsequent categorization of his DNA as
an unwarranted privacy invasion.'o For that reason, the court
held the DNA Act unconstitutional. ,1 However, the dissent
cited the Rise balancing test as binding precedent and argued
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Knights
[d.
[d. at 21-22.
83 [d. at 22.
M See generally, Opening Br. for Appellant, United States v. Kincade, 2002 WL
32181458 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-50380).
85 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir 2003).
86 [d. at 1096, 110l.
87 [d. at 1100-01.
88 [d. at 1102 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)). The
United States Supreme Court's holding in Knights required reasonable suspicion to
search a probationer's home. [d. See also infra notes 115 to 119 and accompanying
text.
89 Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1101, 1112.
90 [d. at 1113-14 ("Privacy erodes fIrst at the margins, but once eliminated, its
protections are lost for good, and the resultant damage cannot be undone") (quoting
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Cancer Ward 192 (Nicholas Bethell & David Burg trans.,
Modern Library 1995) (1968))).
91 Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1113.
81

82
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supported the application of a balancing test because parolees
have a lessened expectation of privacy.92 In response to a petition for rehearing filed by the Department of Justice shortly
after the court issued the decision, the Ninth Circuit issued an
order stating that the Ninth Circuit judges would rehear Mr.
Kincade's appeal en banc.93
B.

EN BANC NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION

Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, who authored the dissent in
the original Kincade opinion, wrote the Ninth Circuit's en banc
decision. 94 Judge Ronald Gould concurred in the decision, offering a different analysis. 95 Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who had
written the original opinion, led the dissent. 96

1.

The Plurality

Five judges, forming a plurality, held that DNA testing of
parolees under the DNA Act was constitutional under a balancing test similar to the test espoused in Rise. 97 The plurality began by acknowledging the "advance of technology" and its implications for Fourth Amendment privacy rights. 98 Then, disagreeing with the original panel decision, the plurality cited
Rise v. Oregon as binding precedent for application of a balancing test to approve blood testing of persons with a lowered expectation of privacy, even though Rise concerned inmates, not
parolees. 99 Kincade's status as a parolee was enough of a privacy-expectation reduction to justify the intrusion. 100

92

[d. at 1114, 1116 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).

United States v. Kincade, 354 F.3d 1000, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); cf Pet. of the
United States for Reh'g and for Reh'g En Bane, United States v. Kincade (No. 0250380) (2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/kincade/us_pet.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005).
.. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004).
95 [d. at 840.
00 [d. at 842.
97 [d. at 839 & n.39.
98 [d. at 821 (citing Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27,33-34 (2001).
99 Kincade, 379 F.3d 837 (citing Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996) (holding that "[olnce a person is convicted of
one of the felonies included as predicate offenses under [Oregon's DNA testing statute],
his identity has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying information derived from the blood sampling.").
100 Kincade, 379 F.3d 839.
93
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The panel also found that compelling policy interests outweighed Kincade's reasonable expectations of privacy.IOI The
overwhelming purpose of parole is to protect the public from
victimization by preventing recidivism, through rehabilitation. l02 The increased ability to identify criminals with the help
of a DNA database creates a deterrent effect because criminals
are aware they could be easily identified by leaving DNA evidence at a crime scene. 103 Thus, the plurality reasoned that
DNA extraction, on balance, was constitutional because of Kincade's lowered expectation of privacy, and the public interest in
creating a comprehensive DNA database. 10. Judge Gould concurred in the opinion, but would have justified the reach of the
DNA statute to Kincade with the special-needs exception. 105

2.

The Dissent

The dissent, following the original Ninth Circuit Kincade
decision, argued that DNA testing must follow the traditional
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure requirements. lOG Because of the strict Fourth Amendment standards of individualized suspicion and reasonableness, the dissent rejected the application of a balancing test. 107 The balancing test was unemployable, the dissent reasoned, because it was too easy to tip
the balance of interests in favor of the government. lOS
The dissent reasoned that under the plurality's balancing
test, essentially anyone with a reduced expectation of privacy is
potentially subject to a blood extraction for CODIS.lo, Given the
expansion of the qualifying crimes covered by the DNA Act, it
seems likely that the scope of people subject to blood testing
101 [d. at 838.
[d. at 839.
[d. at 839 & n.38 (citing Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561) (noting that DNA identification
can "absolve the innocent just as easily as it can inculpate the guilty.").
10< Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839.
105 [d. at 840-42 (Gould, J., concurring). Judge Gould disagreed with the application of the balancing test, finding the special needs exception to be a more proper
analysis. [d. at 842. Noting the plurality's reluctance to apply a special needs test,
Judge Gould reasoned that the deterrent effect of a DNA database "serves the special
needs" of a probation system. [d.
106 [d. at 844 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
107 [d. at 861 & n.21 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
lOB [d. at 849-50, 861 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
109 [d. at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
102
103
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could similarly grow." O Just as convicted criminals have a
lower expectation of privacy, so do people attending public educational institutions, people traveling on airplanes and people
applying for driver's licenses or federal employment.l11 A lowered expectation of privacy, when evaluated as one side of a
simple balancing test, could lead to DNA testing of an everexpanding group of citizens, not limited to parolees who have
committed particularly heinous crimes. ll2 The Kincade holding
likely sets a standard for future Ninth Circuit court decisions.

III. A CRITIQUE OF THE KINCADE BALANCING TEST
The Kincade plurality was confident that when future
DNA testing affects the rights of law-abiding citizens, as opposed to "lawfully adjudicated criminals," the courts would "respond appropriately.""3 But the expansion of caselaw allowing
invasive searches of parolees and the growth of government
interests in DNA testing citizens not yet convicted of crimes
suggests that ordinary citizens' privacy rights are already in
danger.u4 Kincade could easily be used as a rubber-stamp for
government interests. Because of this potential, future court
decisions should narrowly apply the Kincade balancing test,
and not use it as a fa~de or pretense for building overbroad
DNA databases. The test should be limited to persons convicted of, and on parole for, violent crimes, as it was in Kincade, so that government interests do not automatically outweigh the privacy interests of the individual.
A.

CASELAW ALLOWING PAROLEE SEARCHES: LoWERING
STANDARDS

The stretching of the logic of the balancing test through
the caselaw of United States v. Knights, Rise v. Oregon, and
United States v. Kincade, indicates the potential for an overbroad application of the Kincade balancing test.
Id. at 849 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[Alny person who experiences a reduction in his expectation of privacy ... would be susceptible to having his blood sample
extracted and included in CODIS ... .").
112 Id.
113 Id. at 838.
114 See, e.g., infra notes 115 to 154 and accompanying text.
110

111
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United States v. Knights: "Reasonable Suspicion" Required

for Probationers
In Knights, the United States Supreme Court held that a
"reasonable suspicion" standard of criminal activity, rather
than the higher standard of probable cause, could justify the
search of a probationer's home because the probation system's
interests outweighed the probationer's privacy interests. 115 The
probation system's interests in Knights were "rehabilitation"
and preventing recidivism. 11s The Court found that the probationer's status as a probationer lessened his privacy interests.l17
Because of this, the balance tipped in favor of the government. 11S However, Knights did not decide whether a probationer could be searched without "reasonable suspicion."119
2.

Rise v. Oregon: DNA Search of Inmates Approved, No Sus-

picion Necessary
In Rise, the Ninth Circuit extended the Knights logic to allow blood testing of inmates, and eliminated the requirement of
"reasonable suspicion.'''20 The court used a balancing test to
approve DNA blood testing for inmates convicted of murder or
sexual offenses. i2i The government interests in Rise were "preventing recidivism" and maintaining a DNA database to "identifly] and prosecut[e]" criminals. i22 Two factors limited the inmates' privacy interests. i23 First, the inmates had a reduced
expectation of privacy because of their status as convicted felons, as opposed to free persons. i24 Second, the court found the
intrusion too minimal to offend their lessened privacy interests.i25 Thus, the court disregarded the Knights rule and al-

115

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001).

[d. at 119.
m [d. at 119-20.
118 [d. at 12l.
116

United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003).
Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1160 (1996).
12i Rise, 59 F.3d at 156l.
122 [d. at 1562.
123 [d. at 1559-62.
124 [d. at 1560.
125 [d. at 1559.
i19

120
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lowed DNA searches of convicted incarcerated felons without
any level of suspicion of new criminal activity.126
3.

Kincade en banc logic: DNA Search of Parolee's Approved

In Kincade en banc, the court held that a parolee's reduced
expectation of privacy could subject him to DNA blood testing. 127
As in Rise, the government's interests were defined as preventing recidivism and solving future crimes. 128 The parolee's interests were determined according to the Rise standard of minimal intrusion and lowered expectation of privacy.l29 Following
this analysis, the Kincade court found that blood testing did
not constitute a major privacy violation because of the minimal
intrusion. 130 Moreover, parolees' expectations of privacy are
limited because they are under supervision and subject to strict
restrictions while they finish their sentences outside of conTherefore, in Kincade, the balance of interests
finement.
tipped again in favor of the government. 132
The progression of caselaw from Knights through Kincade
en banc indicates that where there is diminished expectation of
privacy and a balancing test is applied, the government interest will outweigh privacy interests. Given this demonstrated
expansion of allowable searches from a lowered threshold of
suspicion in Knights to simply a reduced expectation of privacy
of parolees in Kincade, there is potential for further expansion
of allowable DNA searches.
l3l

B.

GoVERNMENT INTERESTS EXPANDING: NOT JUST VIOLENT
CRIMINALS

DNA-testing legislation has expanded to include more
crimes since its inception. This growth of legislation illustrates
the expansion of the government's goals in connection with
DNA databases beyond the original goals. The Kincade balanc-

Id. at 1562.
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 836.
131 Id. at 834.
132 Id. at 839.
126
127
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ing test should be used with this expansion in mind to prevent
the erosion of privacy interests.
The original purpose of federal DNA testing was to create
a database of offenders who were the "worst of the worst.",33
Murders and rapists were the top priority for DNA testing. ls4
CODIS was created to house identifying information for sex
offenders, and persons convicted of "Federal crimes of violence,
robbery and burglary.",36 The original version of the DNA Act
limited the original qualifying crimes accordingly, and included
murder, sexual abuse, slavery, kidnapping, robbery, and burglary.l36 However, the government's priorities have since
grown.
As the Kincade en bane dissent discussed, the USA
PATRIOT Act expanded the list of qualifying crimes. IS7 This
expansion means that certain nonviolent offenders are now
subject to DNA testing. While several serious crimes, such as
aircraft hijacking were added to the list of qualifying crimes,
less serious offenses are now subject to DNA testing. 13B Some of
these qualifying crimes include crimes such as harboring illegal
aliens,139 egg-product-inspection interference,14o possession of an
unregistered firearm,141 voter-registration coercion,142 and impeding "enforcement officer" inspections of fishing vessels. 143
The government's revision of the list of qualifying crimes to
include nonviolent offenses confirms the potential for more reH.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 10 (2000).
[d.
135 [d. at 9.
136 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2000).
131 U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat 272, 364 (2001).
L38 [d.
See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(2) (2001) for the DNA Act as amended by the
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. The amendment lists any offense committed under 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(a) (2002), or "Federal crime[s) of terrorism" as offenses that qualify for
testing. [d. Aircraft hijacking is one such crime. [d; see also 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2005).
139 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2005), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 28
C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005». 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 is the Federal Regulation that lists offenses
subject to DNA testing. [d. The 2004 version of this regulation listed several crimes
subject to DNA testing. [d. The current version, as amended in January 2005 now
states that any felony qualifies for testing. [d.
140 21 U.S.C. § 1041(b) (2005), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at
28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005».
141 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2005), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at
28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005».
1<2 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 28
C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005».
143 16 U.S.C. § 773e(a)(3), cited in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2004) (current version at 28
C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005».
133
134
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visions. The DNA database is no longer limited to violent offenders.
Expanding government interests are also evidenced by an
October 2004 amendment to the DNA Act that requires DNA
testing for all persons convicted of felonies. The "Justice for All
Act of 2004" amended the DNA Act's list of qualifying felonies
to "any felony.''''' This amendment provides funding and authority for law enforcement agencies to collect DNA from any
person convicted of a felony.
Further, not all felonies are violent. Generally, a felony is
any crime punishable by over a year in prison. 145 For example,
malum prohibitum property crimes such as embezzlement,
false pretenses, or passing bad checks could carry penalties of
more than one year in prison, depending on the nature of the
crime. 146 History thus suggests that the list of qualifying crimes
could continue to grow along with the government's growing
interests in DNA databases.
C.

LOWERED PRIVACY INTERESTS AND PRESUMPTION OF GUILT

The DNA Act currently applies to lawfully adjudicated
convictions only.147 However, recent legislation on the federal
and state level allows persons not yet convicted to be tested
and included in DNA databases. us

144 Justice For All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (2004); see
also 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005).
148 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 1.6(a), 30 (3d ed. 2000).
146 Theft, for example, carries a base level of 7, which the United States Sentencing Guidelines suggest 0-6 years imprisonment. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 2B1. l(a)(1), 5A tbl. (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2004guidlgI2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Malum prohibitum is defined as "[aln act that is crime merely because it is prohibited by statute,
although the act itself is not necessarily immoral." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (2d
Pocket ed. 2001).
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(a)(1) (2004) (stating that the DNA Act applies to
persons who "[arel, or ha[vel been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense") (emphasis
added».
148 See, e.g., California's Proposition 69, where the voters approved DNA testing
for some arrestees. 2004 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 69 § 3 (West) (amending Cal. Penal
Code § 296 (West 2004»; see also Easy Voter Guide re: Proposition 69, available at
http://www.easyvoter.org/californiainextelectionl2004-generall3-69.html (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005).
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Equal Justice for Some?

The Equal Justice for All Act, which amended DNA Act's
qualifying crime list to include all felonies, changed the types of
allowable state DNA profiles in CODIS.I<' States may now include DNA samples of persons indicted in state court proceedings in the federal DNA database.'50 While indictees' cases are,
by definition, not yet lawfully adjudicated, there could be a
temptation to treat indictees as having a lowered expectation of
privacy. 151 This could thus subject persons not convicted of
crimes to the losing side of the balancing test.

2.

California Plans to DNA Test Arrestees and Juveniles

California's Proposition 69, which was approved by voters
in November of 2004, requires DNA testing of all felony arrestees as well as juvenile offenders in California. 152 While those
persons not convicted or found not guilty of any crime may request expungement of their DNA record, the process requires
applying to the trial court for a discretionary expungement most likely people will not bother with it.'53
The Kincade dissent feared that the balancing test was too
weak a standard. 154 Only time will tell if, like the push for testing at indictment and arrest, persons not associated with
criminal behavior will be singled out for testing. Given the expansion of government interests over time, the testing of free
citizens may not be too far-fetched.

IV. CONCLUSION: THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES?
With this push for DNA database expansion, every citizen's privacy rights are in danger. Under a broad application
of the Kincade balancing test, it appears that where a diminI'. Justice For All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (2004).
[d.
An indictee is "[a] person who has been ... officially charged with a crime."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
152 See 2004 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 69 § 3 (West) (amending Cal. Penal Code § 296
(West 2004»; cf Easy Voter Guide, supra note 148.
153 See 2004 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 69 § 9 (West) (amending Cal. Penal Code § 299
(West 2004»; cf Easy Voter Guide, supra note 148.
154 United States V. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 844 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
150
151

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005

19

Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 4
GOLDEN Golden
GATE
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

50

[Vol. 35

ished expectation of privacy exists, it will be outweighed by the
government's interest in taking and storing one's DNA. As the
dissent fears, this diminished expectation of privacy could affect more than just parolees. A balancing test is too simple,
amorphous, and subjective a standard to allow it to be applied
without care. The plurality assured us in Kincade that courts
would recognize when the "parade of horribles" began. 155 But
while our rights slowly erode, we may not even notice. For
some, like people on parole for relatively de minimus offenses
who have a more serious felony in their distant past, it has already begun.
CLAIRE S. HULSE'

[d. at 838.
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